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Disclosure, Trust and Persuasion in Insurance Markets
* 
 
This high-stakes experiment investigates the effect on buyers of mandatory disclosures 
concerning an insurance policy’s value for money (the claims ratio) and the seller’s 
commission. These information disclosures have virtually no effect despite most buyers 
claiming to value such information. Instead, our data reveal that whether the subject is 
generally trusting plays an important role. Trust is clearly associated with greater willingness 
to pay for insurance. Unlike in previous work, trust in our setting is not about obligations 
being fulfilled. The contract is complete, simple and the possibility of breach is negligible. 
However, as for much B2C insurance marketing, face-to-face selling plays a crucial role in 
our experimental design. Trusting buyers are more suggestible, so take advice more readily 
and buy more insurance, although they are no more risk averse than the uninsured. 
Moreover, trusting buyers feel less pressured by sellers, and are more confident in their 
decisions which suggests that they are easier to persuade. Therefore, in markets where 
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1.  Introduction 
In December 2007, the Financial Service Authority (FSA) published new rules to regulate 
insurance selling in the UK. The redesigned Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
(ICOBS) was intended to meet the FSA’s statutory objective to help consumers achieve a 
fair deal. As Dan Waters, FSA Director of Retail Policy and Themes, said in the FSA’s 
press release
1: “ICOBS is another important achievement in more principles-based 
regulation. […] In a few areas […], like payment protection insurance (PPI), we have 
responded to continuing market failures and consumer detriment by introducing carefully 
targeted rules to help ensure that consumers achieve a fair deal”. The sale of payment 
protection insurance (PPI) and mortgage protection insurance (MPI) in the UK has indeed 
aroused much controversy. These policies are typically sold as secondary products by 
lenders, making it hard for buyers to shop around. Clients may not realize that the loan 
and insurance purchases can be separated and that there are competitive insurance 
products readily available. In addition, the policies typically have many exclusions that 
buyers  may  not  be aware of. Selling pressure may result in buyers purchasing 
inappropriate policies at excessive premiums. It is certainly true that PPI policies offer 
lower payout ratios (the fraction of premium income paid out to policy holders) than 
other kinds of insurance, some 15% here compared to 84% for home contents insurance 
(OFT 2006)
2
                                                 
1FSA press release: “FSA cuts back on detailed insurance selling rules but tightens up where customers are 
not being treated fairly”, 18 December 2007. 
.  
2The Office of Fair Trading (OFT 2006, p. 96-97) remarks in the payment protection insurance context 
“Where customers are well informed, they are in a position to make efficient choices…in the absence of 
such information, markets will fail to work efficiently.” OFT (2006, p. 139) also reports anecdotal evidence 
of “pressurised selling due to lenders’ bonus schemes”. In October 2006 the OFT Chief Executive John 
Fingleton said: “Following the work we have undertaken it is clear that many consumers are failed by PPI - 
insurance which gives them a poor deal and often less protection than they think.” 1 
 
ICOBS now includes, for example, a new standard to ensure better oral disclosure of key 
information about policies. However, does more (oral) disclosure of information result in 
different and better decisions? Can salesmanship counter formal disclosure requirements 
in face-to-face insurance selling? This paper reports on an experiment designed to shed 
light on these questions in the context of income and loan payment protection insurance.  
According to conventional economic analysis, the question does not require much 
investigation. Individuals take optimal Bayesian decisions. The provision of extra 
relevant information improves decisions, so a  government should ensure that it is 
delivered in easily digestible form as long as this can be cheaply accomplished. For 
example, revelation of conflicts of interest of the salesperson due to rewards based on the 
number of signed insurance contracts, should lead customers to be more suspicious.  
In contrast, much research in psychology and more recently in behavioral economics 
challenges the idea that more information is always better. Attention is a scarce resource 
and processing power is limited. More information may deflect attention from what is 
really important. A pervasive finding (e.g., Kruschke and Johansen 1999) is that cue 
competition occurs: more salient cues weaken the effects of less salient ones, and the 
presence of irrelevant cues causes subjects to make less use of relevant cues. Introducing 
additional accurate information may therefore lead to worse outcomes.  
Sellers’ disclosure of information  might even  increase rather than decrease trust and 
thereby lead customers into a relaxation of vigilance. Mercer (2005), for example, finds 
that at least in the short-term, more disclosure has a positive effect on management's 
reporting credibility in the eyes of investors, especially when negative information is 
disclosed. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) argue that "there is at least suggestive 
evidence  that  people tend to be naturally trusting and credulous toward their own 
advisors. In the domain of medicine, for example, research shows that while many people 
are ready to acknowledge that doctors generally might be affected by conflicts of interest, 
few can imagine that their own doctors would be affected (Gibbons et al. 1998).”  
Attitudes of this sort feature in what is probably the most famous experiment in social 
science. Stanley Milgram (1963) found that despite considerable misgivings, most people 
are prepared to administer severe electric shocks to strangers if asked to by an authority 2 
 
figure. According to Mixon (1971, 1972), it is trust that makes people accede to such 
requests. Trusting subjects do what they are told. The economics literature has a slightly 
different perspective. As exemplified by the trust game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 
(1995), the specific focus is on beliefs about the future behavior of those you interact 
with. Trusting people make themselves vulnerable to subsequent exploitation because 
they do not expect to be taken advantage of. Thus, trusting (and trustworthy) societies 
solve the hold-up problem in all its manifestations and  prosper.  As the  Milgram 
experiment indicates, this is not the only way trust may have an influence. Consider the 
task of a seller persuading people to buy insurance. Much of the pitch is not reassurance 
the product will perform as promised, but persuading the buyer that they need what is on 
offer. And indeed our high-stakes experiment finds that a generalized capacity to trust 
others, though uncorrelated with risk preferences, is an important determinant of whether 
subjects buy insurance when fulfillment of the contractual terms is not an issue. Even 
telling buyers that the sellers are on commission makes little difference to their behavior.
3
Our buyer subjects were of a full range of ages and were seeking or had recently obtained 
unsecured loans  outside the experiment. The experiment offered the prospect of 
substantial sums of money and/or valuable items but there was a well-defined chance, 
determined by the throw of a die, that these outcomes would not materialize. Subjects 
could take out insurance against the chance of loss. The buyers’ choices could have major 
consequences for them. The 25 seller subjects all had experience of retail selling and 
selling on commission. They received performance pay and in their sessions with buyers 
they followed the same prescribed script, but at two points had the opportunity to make a 
one or two minute personalized “pitch”. 
  
The results show that willingness to pay for insurance depends on the extent to which the 
buyer trusts people in general and on the extraversion of the seller. Trust is though 
uncorrelated with risk preference so it is not picking up a taste for safety.
4
                                                 
3  This resembles the cursed equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) in which players do not fully infer the 
information held by others from their actions. Our buyers are cursed to the extent they do not question the 
motivation for sellers’ advice. 
  
4    In a laboratory experiment Eckel and Wilson (2004) also find no statistical relationship between 
behavioral risk measures and decisions to trust. 3 
 
In our experiment the contract is simple, with the probability of loss known precisely so 
there is no issue of trusting or believing that  the contractual terms  will be fulfilled. 
Trusting individuals appear to accept the recommendation of the partisan seller more 
readily. They are also more confident that they have made the correct choice and they 
feel less pressured by the sellers. There is some support for our findings from decisions 
taken outside the experiment: Buyers with a trusting nature are more likely to actually 
have purchased mortgage protection insurance (MPI).  The high mark-ups of MPIs 
suggest that sellers take advantage of buyer trust by pushing up premiums. Our results 
indicate that information provision is unlikely to offset these effects. 
Most subjects thought it was important to have information on the sellers’ incentives and 
the payout ratio of the policy to take sensible decisions. Presumably, they are aware of 
the possibility of being influenced by biased sellers. Yet willingness to pay for insurance 
is unaffected by the disclosure of these two pieces of information. The personal factor is 
too strong. Compulsory disclosure of  sellers’  incentives and  payout ratios  are both 
ineffective, even if sellers can be relied on to comply with disclosure. 
These results provide mixed support for the dictum that insurance is sold not bought. The 
characteristics of both the seller and the buyer matter. As in standard economic analysis, 
the higher the premium, the lower is demand. Purchase does though reflect more than 
intrinsic risk aversion and value at risk. Trusting subjects appear willing to believe that in 
recommending insurance, sellers are selfless. In our experiment the stakes are high, the 
product is well specified and  sellers have limited opportunity to exert an influence. 
Nevertheless, there are large effects.  
Empirical evidence on the effects of disclosure is sparse. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore 
(2005) appear to be the first to  systematically investigate disclosure of interest. In a 
laboratory experiment subjects are paid for the precision of the estimates of an amount of 
money (coins) in a jar. They see the jar only from a distance and for a short period of 
time. They can, however, take into account advice of a second group of subjects, the 
advisors. Advisors are better informed because they can inspect the jar more closely and 
they are given more time. Advice is not provided face-to-face but the advisors’ views are 
transmitted  on written forms. In three experimental treatments the incentives for the 4 
 
advisors and disclosure of information are varied. In a first treatment, the advisors are 
paid for how closely the subjects guess the total amount of money in the jar. In a second 
and third treatment, the advisors are paid more the more the estimates exceed the true 
amount. While in the first and second treatment (mis)alignment of incentives is not 
revealed to the estimators, misalignment is disclosed in the third treatment. It turns out 
that advisors respond to incentives, i.e., their advice increases by 22% when they are paid 
according to high estimates. Advice is even more biased (47%) when incentives are 
disclosed. The researchers suggest that this surprising result might partly be explained by 
“moral licensing”: disclosing of interest might reduce advisor’s feelings of guilt about 
giving  misleading advice  since buyers should have expected that advice is actually 
biased. Providing advisors with a “moral license” might lead them to bias advice further 
than without disclosure. In fact, estimators tend to discount for the higher advice in the 
case of disclosure but their adjustment is not sufficient.
5
Lacko and Pappalardo (2004) report on a questionnaire study for the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) on a planned mortgage broker compensation disclosure. Recent 
mortgage customers are shown costs information about two hypothetical mortgage loans 
 The estimate of the subjects in 
the disclosure treatment is 28 percent higher than in the treatment with incentives of 
advisors and estimators being aligned. As a result estimators earn less money when 
conflicts of interest are disclosed than when they are not. Advisors make more money 
with disclosure than without. Thus, disclosure in this (stylized) experiment benefits the 
providers of information but not the recipients. These findings are confirmed in a follow-
up study by Koch and Schmidt (2010) who conjecture  that repetition and reputation 
might reduce the negative effects of disclosure. These studies are, however, not designed 
to investigate the role of trust when disclosing information. 
                                                 
5  This finding is in line with an empirical study by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) who analyze 
how investors respond to recommendation by analysts. They show that analysts’ forecasts are extremely 
biased upward and that small investors (in contrast to large investors) are subject to persuasion. Small 
investors do not discount for the additional distortions due to analyst affiliation. Evidence on the intricacies 
of persuasion comes from research on consumer credit marketing. Bertrand et al. (2010) find that showing 
fewer example loans, not suggesting a particular use for the loan, or including a photo of an attractive 
woman increases loan demand by about as much as a 25% reduction in the interest rate. Their findings also 
suggest that advertising content persuades by appealing to intuition rather than reason. For an overview of 
empirical evidence on persuasion see Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010). Studies from psychology show 
that emotions, for example, fear induced by insurance sellers about possible negative future contingencies, 
can considerably alter the persuasive impact of messages (De Steno et al. 2004). 5 
 
and are asked to identify which of the two would cost them less and which loan they 
would choose if they were shopping for a mortgage. Answers are not incentivized. In 
different treatments different versions of information disclosure that actually have been 
proposed in the political arena, are provided for one of the loans. All tested disclosure 
versions result in significant consumer confusion about loan costs. Disclosure leads a 
significant proportion of borrowers to mistakenly choose more expensive loans. 
However, disclosure  of information does not always  lead to confusion of customers, 
especially if it is provided to reduce biases as is shown by Bertrand and Morse (2009). 
They use a randomized field trial to evaluate how various kinds of information disclosure 
about the costs of payday loans impact on people’s decision to borrow from pay day 
lenders. They are able to show that some kind of information that helps people to avoid 
narrow decision frames, i.e., to focus more on the cost of using payday loans for long-
term finance, and in particular information that reinforces the adding-up effect over pay 
cycles, reduces the take-up of payday loans by about 10 percent. 
In this paper we argue that disclosure of conflict of interest and disclosure of information 
on payout ratios has virtually no impact in face-to-face insurance selling. One of the 
reasons is that experienced sellers can exploit the fact that to a considerable extent, 
consumers of financial products believe what they are told.
6 They are trusting.
7
                                                 
6  A number of papers, for example Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) and Bertrand et al. (2010) find 
evidence that preferences are constructed though do not explicitly examine the role of trust. Mullainathan, 
Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2008) argue that uninformative messages are effective in financial services 
because consumers inappropriately transfer some property of an entity the seller puts in the mind of the 
buyer (say a grandfather and grandson fishing) to a financial product. This paper provides evidence that 
such unsubstantiated claims are believed. Why they should be is probably a topic for evolutionary 
psychology. Perhaps in the small groups with limited migration that characterised hunter gatherer society 
untruths would normally be discovered and be sure to rebound on the perpetrator. Developing an aversion 
to lying may then, as found by Gneezy (2005), be advantageous. Because it pays to be truthful, it is rational 
to believe what people say. This contrasts with the rational scepticism approach of Milgrom (2008). 
 We don’t 
ask  for  this claim be taken on trust. The next section of the paper explains the 
experimental design. Then results are analyzed. After a discussion on generalized trust 
and openness to persuasion, conclusions are drawn. 
7  A number of papers in the marketing literature identify characteristics of successful sellers (for a review 
see Swan, Bowers, and Richardson 1998). In the context of financial services, Georges and Guenzi (2009) 
find that likability and customer orientation increase a client’s trust in a salesperson and clients who trust 
the seller say they are more likely to return. This study, like the others does not though identify what makes 
buyers receptive.  6 
 
2.  Experimental Design and Procedure 
Subjects comprised potential buyers and sellers of insurance. All subjects were recruited 
by ORC, a market research company, who also administered the experiment. The 214 
buyers were members of the general public who had either recently obtained an 
unsecured loan or were seeking one.
8
Buyers were paid an attendance fee of £25 and were told that they also stood to win up to 
£5,750 in cash or a valuable prize. Once recruited, buyers were sent through the post an 
illustrated leaflet describing 10 prizes and were told that each was valued at about £2,500. 
These items included a motorbike, Rolex watches, holidays, a plasma TV, and so forth. 
Buyers were told that they could win one of these items and asked to think about which 
one they would prefer. When they arrived at the venue they were asked which prize they 
had chosen. 
  All 25 sellers had experience of commission 
selling, though not of marketing of financial products. The experiment was conducted on 
two successive Saturdays in September 2007 in 5 venues around the UK. Each seller 
dealt with 7 to 9 buyers. Sellers were paid an attendance fee of £180 and were also in 
receipt of performance pay, the nature of which will be described later. 
Buyers met a seller face-to-face. For the key instructions sellers followed a script. As an 
example, the script for one of the treatments is reproduced in Appendix A. The 
corresponding decision sheets supplied to buyers are in Appendix B. Sellers were allowed 
to make small talk to put the buyers at their ease. At two points that will be identified the 
sellers were given a minute or two to make a sales pitch. 
Valuation questions 
It was explained to buyers that they would be asked to make 21 choices with each choice 
carrying a number. At the end of the session they would draw one of these numbers at 
random from a bag. The buyer’s choice on this numbered question determines their 
payoff if, in addition, they are randomly selected as the (single) winner from the two 
hundred or so participants.  
                                                 
8 The FSA were concerned with the misselling of insurance to borrowers. 7 
 
The first set of 11 questions was of the form: 
Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
I prefer: 
       □  My chosen item       OR            □  £x 
The value of £x goes from £625 to £3,125 in £250 increments. 
These questions establish the subject’s monetary equivalent, v, of the chosen item. v is set 
equal to the mean of the highest monetary amount rejected and the lowest monetary 
amount accepted. For subjects that rejected the item in all choices, v was set equal to 
£500 and if the item was preferred in all choices v = £3,300. 
The next two sets of questions concern insurance choices. One involves income 
protection insurance (IPI) and the other loan payment protection insurance (LPI). Half 
the subjects received the income protection insurance questions first, and half the loan 
payment protection insurance questions first. 
Income protection insurance 
For the income protection case, the subject faced  a risky income prospect. After 
answering the five questions the subjects rolled a die. If they threw anything but a six, the 
payoff is v+£2,500. Throwing a six means that nothing is paid. Subjects could opt for 
insurance at premium p  to protect the v  component of income. With insurance, the 
subjects received v if a six is thrown and for all other numbers v+£2,500-p. The format of 
these questions is: 
Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
[ ]  no insurance (i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other 
number you get v+£2,500)  
[ ] insurance at premium p (i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get v and if you throw any other 
number you get v+£2,500-p) 8 
 
Of course for each subject the numerical values of v and p were filled in. All that differs 
across these questions is the insurance premium, p. The value of p  was chosen to 
represent payout ratios of 30%, 40%, 50%, 70%, 90%.
9
Had the buyers been aware that the income protection insurance questions were coming 
up, there would have been a strategic incentive to overstate valuations in the first set of 
questions since doing so provides better opportunities in the income protection insurance 
questions. In fact buyers were not recruited from a common organization and were 
unaware of the questions that would be asked.  
  
Prior to the buyers making their insurance choices, sellers were allowed a couple of 
minutes to explain the virtues of insurance. The sellers were told: 
“You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have read out 
the text, e.g. you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had 
not bought insurance and had thrown a ‘6’.”  
Loan payment protection insurance 
For the loan payment protection insurance questions subjects were told that they had 
taken out a loan to buy their chosen object. If all went well they would have enough 
income to repay the loan and still have £2,500 left over. However, after answering the 
five questions in this section, they would throw a die. If a six was thrown, it meant they 
had no income, the loan would not be repaid and the item would be repossessed. So in 
this event the subject would end up with nothing. However, insurance could be taken out 
to protect the loan repayment. So if insurance is chosen and a six is thrown the subject 
still gets to keep the item but has no income. The lender will increase the loan to pay the 
insurance premium, so if a six is not thrown the subject gets the object and the amount 
left over after repayment of the augmented loan, i.e., £2,500-p. For loan payment 
insurance, the format of the questions is: 
 
                                                 
9  The 30% payout ratio is towards the upper end of what actual PPI policies deliver (OFT, 2006, p. 142 and 
OFT 2006). 9 
 
Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
[ ] no insurance (i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other 
number you get your chosen item plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
[ ] insurance which increases the loan repayment by p (i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get 
your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you get your chosen 
item plus the £2,500-p left after repaying the loan)  
Subjects again received the appropriate decision sheets with v  and  p  replaced by 
numerical values. All that differs across the five questions is the magnitude of the 
premium. Sellers were again allowed to make a short “pitch” prior to the buyers making 
their choices. 
Setting money at risk in the income protection policy equal to v means that in value terms 
the subjects faced the same choices for both sets of questions. Hence, according to 
expected utility theory, subjects should make the same choices.
10
Sellers were given two forms of performance pay in addition to their attendance fee. Each 
of the ten insurance options ticked by a subject earned the seller an extra pound. There 
was also a tournament element, as often employed in the insurance selling business. The 
seller recording the highest average number of ticked insurance options won £2,000.  
 
Information disclosure 
Two kinds of information disclosure were provided. Half the buyers were told the payout 
(claims) ratio for income protection insurance.
11
“We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses. For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for 
every pound of premium income, on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to 
policy holders. ” 
 Sellers read the following statement: 
                                                 
10  At least if the utility function is separable in income and the object. Hsee and Kunreuther (2000) provide 
evidence that people are in fact prepared to insure items they own and like for more than their monetary 
value. This endowment effect should also be reflected in v so would not figure in our experiment. 
11  For loan payment protection insurance the market price of the item was not made explicit so as to make 
the choices easier to comprehend. Thus payout ratios could not be disclosed. 10 
 
The questions then specified the actual payout ratio. 
In addition, half the buyers were informed that sellers were on performance pay. For 
these buyers, sellers read the following statement: 
“I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize.” 
The experiment thus has a 2x2x2 structure with the eight treatments summarized in Table 




Table 1  Treatment summary 
  Payout ratio not revealed  Payout ratio revealed 
  IPI first  LPI first  IPI first  LPI first 
Seller incentives  
not revealed  A  B  C  D 
Seller incentives 
revealed  E  F  G  H 
 
Once the experiment was completed, the subjects were passed to an ORC employee who 
asked a series of debriefing questions including whether a subject would prefer £2,500 
for sure or a 50-50 lottery of £8,000 or nothing at all. The answer to this question serves 
as our measure of risk aversion in the following analysis. Trust is measured on a Likert 
scale in answer to the question “I see myself as someone who is generally trusting.” (see 
Q2 in Table C5 in Appendix C).
13 Basic demographic and economic data were collected 
on recruitment.
14
                                                 
12 Due to no-shows or overbooking of participants, a few sellers dealt with 7 or 9 buyers. 
 
13  If the trust question were asked prior to the insurance choices it is possible that subjects would modify 
their behavior to live up to their self report. Asking after the choices, risks subjects giving answers that 
validate their behavior. However, while sellers greatly differed in their effectiveness, seller dummies do not 
significantly explain trust, suggesting answers were not influenced by the selling experience. 
14  See Appendix C. Table C1 provides summary statistics on the general demographic, personality and 
lifestyle characteristics of the buyers. Table C2 shows some financial characteristics of buyers and Table 11 
 
3.  Results 
The distribution of the maximum payout ratios subjects are willing to buy insurance at is 
shown in Figure 1. Switch points are the critical payout ratios
15
•  1. Don’t insure even when claim ratio 90%. 
: 
•  2. Insure if claim ratio better than 70%. 
•  3. Insure if claim ratio better than 50%. 
•  4. Insure if claim ratio better than 40%. 
•  5. Insure if claim ratio better than 30%. 
•   6. Insure if claim ratio 30%. 
The modal choice is that insurance is taken whatever the payout ratios, but about 50% of 
subjects do not buy at a payout ratio of 30%. As Figure 1 indicates, and a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test confirms, there is no difference between the distribution of insurance 
demand to protect the chosen item (LPI)  or to protect an amount of money (IPI) 
considered equivalent by the subjects. The correlation between the two variables is 0.46 
and is highly significant. Given that the two choices were not contiguous and not framed 
so as to alert subjects to their similarity (subjects were not reminded of their object 
valuations for the LPI choice), the consistency in choices is striking.
16
The most straightforward way to discover  what matters for demand is  to estimate a 
willingness to pay  (WTP) for insurance  function. For intermediate switch points we 
assign WTP as the midpoint between the highest premium for which a subject opts for 
insurance and the next highest premium. Less obvious is WTP for those subjects that 
always insure and those that never insure. For the former group we record WTP as the 
highest premium offered plus £100 and for the latter the lowest premium offered less £50. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
C3 summarizes buyers’ views related to the experiment. Table C4 provides characteristics of sellers and 
Table C5 shows our questions on personality traits. 
15  Fewer than 5% of question sets were filled in inconsistently in the sense of opting for insurance when 
the premium is high but not doing so when the premium is lower. If buyers made inconsistent choices 
sellers were asked to make a remark along the lines of “I notice that when the premium is higher you are 
more inclined to choose insurance. Is this what you intend?” If the choice was revised in the light of this 
prompt, this was recorded. Only 22 revised choices were made. 
16 The order of LPI and IPI was not significant in willingness to pay. 12 
 
Varying these values makes little difference.  Mean object WTP is £1,150 and mean 
money WTP is £1,130. The difference is small and not significant even at the 25% level 
and no variables are significant in explaining the difference. We therefore take the 
difference in valuations as noise and sum the two WTPs to get a more accurate measure. 




The conclusions we draw depend on all the equations we estimate, so an initial map of 
the findings is probably helpful: 
1)  Disclosure of seller incentives and payout ratios does not have significant effects on 
demand. 
2)  Demand for insurance is increasing in the extent to which buyers have a trusting 
nature. Magnitudes are large (the most trusting are willing to pay premiums 50% 
higher than the least trusting) and trust effects are highly significant.  
3)  Trust is not significant in explaining risk preferences. 
4)  Trusting subjects are more confident their decisions are correct and feel less sales 
pressure.  








1 2 3 4 5 6
IPI LPI13 
 
5)  Trust is significant in explaining  the field choice  whether subjects purchased 
mortgage protection insurance (outside the experiment).  
6)  Sellers differ considerably in their effectiveness with the more extravert the most 
effective.  
Information disclosure 
Reminding buyers that sellers are incentivized to persuade people to buy insurance might 
be expected to lower demand. In OFT (2006, p. 139) it was speculated that pressurized 
selling may result from lenders’ bonus schemes although it proved impossible to verify 
the existence of such schemes. Evidence is available on the Daily Mail Thisismoney site. 
Staff at NatWest and Royal Bank of Scotland earn three times the number of bonus points 
for selling a loan with payment protection insurance (PPI) than for selling the loan on its 
own.
17,18 The reason for such bonuses is no surprise when it is realized that of the £5.4bn 
received in PPI premiums, some £4bn may be profits.
19
Every seller had to disclose to some of their subjects, selected at random, the payout 
ratios or seller incentives or both. Given an equal number with payout ratios (seller 
incentives) disclosed and not disclosed, buyer and seller characteristics that may affect 
insurance choice should be equally distributed across the disclosure and non-disclosure 
groups. In Table 2, equation 1 is for WTP with dummy variables to capture seller effects. 
 Were customers aware of this, 
they might treat the sales pitch more skeptically and be less inclined to buy PPI or MPI. 
Revealing this information in the form of a low payout ratio may also be expected to 
depress demand for PPI, both because it indicates the policies are in some sense poor 
value for money and due to resentment at the exploitation. The experiment looks into 
these issues. 
                                                 
17  http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/campaigns/article.html?in_article_id=412313&in_page_id=163 
18  Looking to what is received by firms rather than individual sellers, median average commission rates for 
single premium policies vary from 50% for first charge mortgages to 66% for those selling unsecured loans 
and motor finance PPI. Median average commission rates for regular premium PPI policies varied from 
35% for first charge mortgages to 70% for retail credit (FSA 2007). 
19  http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/campaigns/article.html?in_article_id=412482&in_page_id=163 14 
 
As equation 1 shows, neither kind of disclosure has significant effects on insurance 
demand.
20
One possibility is that buyers interpret disclosure as honesty on the part of the seller so if 
anything it enhances credibility. It is true that the statement the sellers must read says 
they are “required” to make the disclosure but this may not be picked up by buyers. More 
generally, sellers may be able to neutralize the effects of disclosure, for example, by 
reading the statement with a laugh as if to say “this is a formality that makes no 
difference to our relationship”. 
 
Buyer characteristics 
Equation 1 in Table 2  shows that buyer trust is highly significant.
21
   
  The coefficient 
implies that the most trusting individuals are prepared to pay a premium over 50% higher 
than the least trusting. Other variables have the expected sign. Value at risk has the 
positive sign implied by standard theory and is extremely significant. Income has a 
significant negative effect on WTP, consistent  with the usual finding of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. Risk aversion, as measured by the lottery choice question does 
matter for insurance purchase and enters with the right sign. WTP is significantly lower 
for the first two sessions a seller conducts (first) and the last two (last). Sellers apparently 
perfect their selling technique during the day long session - at least until exhaustion 
decreases their performance. Age and gender were not significant and were dropped from 
the equation. 
                                                 
20  Lacko and Pappalardo (2004) find a similar result. 
21  Buyer trust is not significant in explaining v, willingness to pay for the item, which was measured prior 
to encountering the insurance seller. This again indicates that trust matters in the insurance decision only 
because of the influence of the sellers. 15 
 
Table 2 
  (1)  (2)  (3)             (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 










WTP  MPI 














Seller Performance      1.36*** 
(4.27)    0.72*** 
(5.37)     
Seller Extraversion            80.1* 
(1.77)   
Value at Risk (v)  1020*** 
(11.70)        -0.06* 
(-2.00) 
1026*** 
(15.80)   
Income  -9.4** 
(-2.10) 
.0001 








Risk Aversion  417** 








First  -386** 
(2.40) 
0.14* 





(-2.14)   
Last  -314** 
(-2.10) 
0.03 









(-0.04)      -0.21 




(0.28)      -0.5 
(1.57)       
Worry              0.02 
(1.23) 
Male    -0.11* 
(-1.86)           
Married              0.25** 
(2.29) 
Age    0.003** 
(2.18)          0.04 
(0.82) 
Age Squared              -0.0006 
(-1.07) 




















Equations 1-4 include seller dummies. Equations 5 and 6 have standard errors clustered by sellers. t-values 
in brackets. ***means significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%. “Seller Extraversion” is measured by 
combining answers to Q1 and (with reversed sign) answers to Q6 in Table C5 (Rammstedt and John 2007). 16 
 
The most obvious objection to the claim  that equation  (1) provides evidence of the 
importance of trust is that the variable is proxying for risk aversion. Equation 2 suggests 
this is not so. Trust is not significant in explaining risk aversion though gender and age do 
have the conventional signs.
22
If buyer trust is a measure of the extent to which buyers do not question the advice that 
they receive from sellers then more trusting types should feel less pressured by sellers. 
Similarly, if the trusting are less inclined to question what they are told, they will be more 
confident in their decisions. Equations 3 and 4 show that both implications apply. 
 It is somewhat surprising that those sold insurance at the 
start of the day are more risk averse. However, psychologists have found that moods vary 
through the day. For example, people are least optimistic in the late afternoon (Thayer 
1987). So it is not impossible that the risk aversion effect is real. 
A possible objection to the claim that trust determines WTP is that the selling experience 
determines the answer to the subsequently administered trust question. People who are 
swayed by the seller justify themselves by reporting they are trusting.
23
As remarked in the Introduction, mortgage protection insurance in the UK has typically 
been sold face-to-face after a mortgage deal is agreed. It has low payout ratios and many 
exclusions. Trust might therefore be thought to play a part in its purchase. Equation (7) 
regresses a dummy for holding MPI outside the experiment on trust and other variables. 
The subjects are restricted to those with mortgages in full time employment (the most 
important role of MPI is to cover spells of unemployment). MPI is a product that has only 
come to prominence in recent years as banks have recognised its profitability. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on when the mortgage was taken out but this may be 
approximated by the age of the subjects. Given the long-term nature of the cover and its 
 To address this 
issue we regressed individual trust on the seller performance variable defined in the next 
section and found that it was not significant indicating that trust is not endogenous.  
                                                 
22  These variables are included to help validate the risk preference measure but were not significant in the 
WTP equations.  
23 Of course, had the trust question been asked be prior to the insurance questions the choices might have 
been modified to justify the trusting claim. 17 
 
magnitude it might be that subjects with a tendency to worry might be attracted to MPI. 
According to equation (7) trust is indeed important in this setting.
24
So far the emphasis has been on buyer characteristics. As not all sellers will be equally 
trustworthy, or skilled at presenting themselves as such, and if trust makes buyers more 
receptive to seller claims, it should matter for WTP whom a buyer is matched with.  
  
Influence of sellers 
F-tests were performed on equation 1 to check whether the seller effects are significant.  
The F statistic equals 2.46 with significance level 0.0005, indicating that seller effects are 
indeed very important in explaining WTP. The seller effects are not only statistically 
significant, they are also large. The three worst sellers achieved WTP 34% below average 
and the three best 43% above (both measures controlling for buyer characteristics). 
Equation 5 provides an alternative perspective on seller effects. The dependent variable is 
a dummy equal to one if the individual buys both types of insurance at the lowest (30%) 
payout rate. The  seller performance variable  indicates, for each subject, the seller’s 
success with other subjects. That is, for each subject, seller performance  equals the 
fraction of the seller’s other  subjects who bought insurance at all payout ratios. If 
insurance choices only depend on intrinsic risk preferences, others’ decisions regarding 
insurance purchase from a particular seller should not affect a subject’s insurance choice. 
However, it is evident from equation 5 that a seller’s success in selling to other subjects is 
a highly significant predictor of the chance that a subject buys insurance at 30% payout 
ratio. This again provides evidence that sellers differ in their ability to persuade buyers to 
take out insurance policies. Risk aversion is considerably more significant than in the first 
equation. This may be because the binary measure captures the most risk averse and in 
this regression the dependent variable is also a binary division for the most willing to 
insure. Buyer trust remains significant though somewhat less so. Equation 5 has the same 
message as equation  1. Rather than basing their insurance purchase decision on the 
                                                 
24 In contrast trust was not significant in explaining whether subjects purchased travel insurance (some 
50% of the sample did). Travel insurance is not normally sold face-to-face so trust would not be expected 
to be so important. 18 
 
objective characteristics of policies, buyers appear to be highly susceptible to seller 
influence. 
At first sight, seller effects will be greater for more trusting subjects if trust really is a 
measure of credulity.  This does not follow,  so testing for interaction effects is not 
appropriate. Suppose W=f(M(S,T), X) where W is WTP, M is message effectiveness, S is 
an index of seller effectiveness, T is buyer trust and X a vector of other relevant effects. 
Then WS=fMMS and WST=fMMMTMS+fMMST. The natural assumptions are that fMM <0, MT, 
MS>0, fM>0, and MST  is of ambiguous sign. So if more effective sellers are able to 
enhance message effectiveness by the same magnitude whatever the degree of buyer trust 
(MST=0) then the greater is buyer trust, the less difference is made by a good seller. A 
necessary but not sufficient condition to reverse this conclusion is that good sellers are 
more effective in enhancing the message when the buyer is trusting. 
Though it seems clear that there are seller effects, equations 1, 2, and 5 do not identify 
what it is about sellers that makes them successful. Equation 6 shows that more extravert 
sellers generate higher WTP. It is plausible that extraverts are best able to bond in a short 
time and project the right image of trustworthiness. 
 
4.  Discussion: Trust and Openness to Persuasion 
Whereas a burgeoning empirical literature finds that trust matters for aggregate economic 
performance (Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001, Tabellini 2008, Algan and 
Cahuc 2010), why trust matters remains an open question. In the context of financial 
markets, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008), building on Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004), report that generalized trust is a significant determinant of whether individuals 
invest in the stock market and that countries exhibiting greater average levels of trust 
have higher stock market participation rates. The interpretation they give is that low-trust 
individuals expect low returns because they believe there is an appreciable chance that 
“the company is just a scam, that the manager steals all the proceeds, or that the broker 
absconds with the money instead of investing it” (p. 2563). In their formulation, investors 
are indifferent to how they lose money, whether through being cheated or through bad 19 
 
luck. Since outright fraud is rare in most economies, it can  only be a major 
discouragement to buying stocks if low-trust individuals are highly pessimistic, contrary 
to the general finding that optimism is the norm. Moreover, portfolio diversification 
effectively mitigates the risk of losing money through fraud. 
An alternative view is that whereas trust concerns beliefs about the future behavior of the 
trustee, the reason it matters so much is down to preferences. Many people think it is 
worse to lose money through a scam than through an honest gamble that fails. There is 
experimental evidence of such “betrayal aversion” (Bohnet  et al. 2008, Bohnet, 
Herrmann and Zeckhauser 2010). If people put high weight on not being made a fool of, 
trust becomes a much more powerful determinant of behavior even if the objective 
chance of fraud is low.  
This paper is about a third, neglected, channel through which trust may operate. This 
involves beliefs, but not about future behavior. The claim is that in all situations people 
with high trust tend to believe what they are told, including hype. For example, trusting 
types really believed that dotcoms had created a new economy or that “Avis try harder”. 
Such credulity is especially likely if the message is delivered personally.
25
                                                 
25  In one-shot trust games in which subjects were shown photographs of their partners, Scharlemann et al. 
(2001) find that smiling positively affects trust among strangers. Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) 
investigate the influence of face-to-face communication in a bilateral bargaining situation with asymmetric 
information and find improvements in efficiency. “Face-to-face negotiations nearly always involved a 
significant proportion of the early bargaining time taken up in getting to know more about one another and 
talking about topics unrelated to the negotiation, setting a positive tone for the entire negotiation… trust 
was discussed explicitly. For example, a buyer tried to explain to a seller why he was having a hard time 
accepting at face value her (truthful) claim… ‘How can I trust you?... It’s all a matter of trust.’ This pair 
went on to slowly reveal the private information held by each side.” (pp. 230-231). 
 “Blue really 
suits you”. “You won’t find a better insurance policy than the one I am selling”. “Now is 
the right time to buy stocks”. “Imagine the effect on your family if you would lose your 
job and you don’t have income protection insurance.” The information content of these 
messages is negligible and certainly does not concern the  future behavior of the 
persuader. What the messages rely on is that trusting people don’t need much reason to 
follow advice. Nor is the thought that such recommendations may be self-serving 
troubling. “Trusting your bank” is associated with greater stock market participation 20 
 
because their advice to buy shares is believed not because it measures the probability 
clients think the bank will abscond with the funds. 
Most definitions of trust identify willingness to delegate as the key element. According to 
Fehr (2009), “An individual…trusts if she voluntarily places resources at the disposal of 
another party without any legal commitment from the latter.” (p. 238). In Rousseau et al. 
(1998), “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” (p. 395). Both 
definitions imply a willingness to hand control to someone who has the potential to take 
advantage of the trustor. It is debatable whether these formulations cover willingness to 
believe what others tell you even if there is no resource transfer. Visiting Sir John 
Soane’s Museum in London based on a conversation with a stranger at an airport 
certainly seems to involve trust, but no resources are placed at the disposal of another. 
The persuadability component of trust that arises in our experiment has been neglected in 
the literature, but is  important in many economic contexts  such as advertising, 
professional services and so forth.
26  The reason trust appears to  influence aggregate 
economic performance (as in the literature initiated by Knack and Keefer 1997 and Zak 
and Knack 2001) may not just be that it facilitates transactions but because people 
respond to the advice of teachers, friends and governments.
27
Some  studies  have attempted to find a link between generalized trust questions and 
behavior in the trust game. The motivation is that (for economists) the amount sent is a 
direct measure of trust, so if it is not correlated with the trust question, this challenges its 
interpretation in macro studies of economic performance. However, in the trust game, 
persuasion does not have a role to play. Our contention is that one route by which trust 
matters in an economy is because it implies openness to persuasion. In our setting, neither 
 
                                                 
26  Akerlof and Shiller (2009) argue that trust, in the sense investigated here, played a major role in the 
financial crisis. The boom was exaggerated by over-confidence. The etymology of confidence is from fido, 
I trust. People trusted the general hype that house prices would rise. Lewis (2010) amongst others argues 
that even supposedly sophisticated bankers took the judgement of ratings agencies on CDOs on trust. 
27  If trust and trustworthiness evolve together then high trust economies may perform best although the 
most trusting in any society may be worse off because they tend to be duped. Butler, Giuliano and Guiso 
(2009) find evidence along these lines. 21 
 
reciprocation nor betrayal-aversion are relevant but generalized trust may still matter 
because it is associated with openness to persuasion.
28
Evidence on whether generalized trust explains behavior in the trust game is mixed. 
Sapienza, Tolda and Zingales (2007) find that for incoming Chicago MBAs, the amount 
sent is mainly but not entirely explained by the  sender’s beliefs as to the receiver’s 
behavior, which in turn correlate with standard survey questions about trusting others. 
Fehr et al. (2003) also find that for a representative sample of the German population, 
trust increases the amount sent, but Glaeser et al. (2000) do not obtain a significant 
correlation. Sapienza, Tolda, and Zingales (2007) conjecture that the reason for this is 
that the Glaeser et al. subjects are seasoned Harvard undergraduates, a relatively 
homogeneous population. These students think the receiver is probably just like them, 
and (falsely) extrapolate their own trustworthiness to the likely behavior of the receiver. 
Hence, generalized trust does not explain the amount sent, though it would if the subjects 
were drawn from the whole population, because then it is realized that most people are 
not ‘just like me’ so trust cannot be projected. In our experiment, buyers have little 
knowledge of the sellers background so the “just like me projection” is unlikely to apply 
so generalized trust is potentially relevant. 
 
This paper argues that trust matters for mediated insurance purchase even when betrayal 
is not an issue. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) propose that trust may matter for the 
purchase of insurance contracts because they are financial contracts with “delayed and 
uncertain repayment”. They find that those with private health insurance are more 
trusting, but the effect is not significant. In our experiment, insurance does not involve 
delay or contractual uncertainty, but trust is a highly significant determinant of demand. 
Sellers do not reassure that the terms will be honored in spirit or letter, but explain the 
                                                 
28  Guilt aversion, introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2005), provides a possible reason why. Buyers 
do not wish to disappoint the expectation of sellers. This may help explain why disclosure of sellers’ 
commission is ineffective. So trusting behavior is motivated by the taste for guilt (or perhaps rudeness) 
aversion.  22 
 
psychological merits of being insured.
29 Trust matters because it determines the extent to 




5.  Conclusion 
The message of this paper is twofold. First, we find no evidence that disclosure of seller 
incentives and actual payout ratios substantially changes buyers’ behavior. Second, trust 
seems to play a major role in face-to-face (insurance) selling since intrinsically trusting 
people are easily persuaded. This neglected aspect of trust is potentially important. It 
implies  people are easily taken in by self-interested advisers such as sales people. 
Competition in the persuasion market may neutralize some of the resulting bias, but not 
all of it. Rival pitches by,  say,  car makers  may perhaps result in a balanced final 
evaluation of which car to buy but the case for not having a car at all may go unstated. 
Appropriate intervention depends on the extent to which consumers are credulous. For 
example, Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) show that in markets in which sellers advise 
buyers, whether there should be statutory cancellation and a returns policy depends on the 
extent to which consumers believe cheap talk. 
In our experiment, seller persuasion, not just intrinsic risk preference, is a major influence 
on insurance decisions. Whether an individual is insured depends on which seller they are 
matched with. Some sellers are particularly effective and trusting buyers are especially 
susceptible to seller influence.
31
                                                 
29  If there was doubt about whether promises would be kept it is not obvious why they would specifically 
affect the insurance option and not the alternative experimental choices.  
 Given the importance of trust, it is not surprising that the 
disclosure of seller commissions has little effect on choice. The design of the experiment 
eliminates the possibility that trust matters because of uncertainty about whether parties 
30  Schotter (2003) observes that laboratory subjects exhibit a general tendency to follow advice even when 
advisers are naïve in the sense that they are hardly more expert in the task at hand than the advisees. The 
influence of advisees’ trust is not measured in these experiments.  
31  This intuition is in line with recent findings on the biological basis of trust since human mechanisms for 
social bonding and the inclination to trust seem to share common biochemical foundations. Kosfeld et al. 
(2005) find that the neuropeptide oxytocin increases the amount sent by first movers in the trust game. 
Guastella, Mitchell, and Mathews (2008) show that oxytocin-administered  humans are more likely to 
recollect happy human faces compared with angry and neutral ones. This indicates that oxytocin enhances 
the encoding of positive social approach, intimacy, and bonding by strengthening encoding of positive 
social information over social information that is either neutral or negative. 23 
 
will fulfill future obligations. Instead, the key feature is willingness to accept advice at 
face value. This feature allows trust to have more pervasive effects than do  existing 
interpretations. 
Relative to the typical mortgage protection insurance purchase environment, where the 
persuader has monopoly access to the buyer and the interaction is an extended one, 
buyers in the experiment were less exposed to seller pressure. Moreover, the insurance 
industry has every incentive to recruit the most effective sellers. It therefore seems likely 
that our results would be at least as strong for actual (face-to-face) sales.
32 Also, the 
policies offered in the experiment were considerably simpler than real MPI and PPI 
products. This simplicity seems likely to curtail the ability of sellers to sway choices; in 
more complicated real insurance settings seller influence is probably even more 
important.
33
Economies exhibiting high levels of trust tend to be more prosperous. The usual 
explanation is that trust and trustworthiness co-evolve to provide a social remedy to the 
problem of incomplete contracts. The results of our experiment suggest another 
mechanism. Trusting people do what they are told. Could it be that some level of 
persuadability is good for economic growth?  
 The experiment therefore appears relevant in identifying the determinants of 
demand for policies available in the market. This is confirmed by the finding that subjects 
with a  more trusting disposition  are more likely to have bought  MPI  outside the 
experiment. 
                                                 
32  Some 55% of PPI purchases are made in face-to-face sales (FSA 2007). 
33  In a survey of PPI purchase it was reported “Respondents showed virtually no engagement with the 
product and relied on whatever they were told by the sales adviser” (FSA 2007) 24 
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Script for Treatment H 
 





Ask the participant which item he/she has chosen. Make sure that all items are 
filled in on the cover page of the decision sheets. 
 
Read the following instructions aloud to the participant… 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment on financial decision making 
being run for the Financial Services Authority by the London School of Economics and 
implemented by ORC. 
 
In addition to your participation fee of £25, which is yours for sure, you could win a 
substantial amount of cash and/or your selected item.  
 
The procedure is that you will be asked to answer twenty one numbered questions 
involving choices between money amounts and/or your selected prize item. In this bag 
there are 21 numbers (from 1 to 21), one for each question. At the end of the session I will 
ask you to draw one number at random. The number on it identifies the question that will 
determine your outcome if you are the person selected as the overall winner. What you will 
get if you are the winner is the option you selected in that question. 
 
The overall winner will be selected at random from about two hundred participants once 
the experiment is completed. If you are the winner you will be notified by mid-October. 
 
When answering each of the 21 questions, you should therefore think carefully about your 
answers since one of them will determine what you obtain if you are the overall winner. 
 
The first set of questions involves choosing between your selected prize item and amounts 
of money. In successive questions the cash alternative is increased so you have to decide 






  Ask the participant to look at decision sheet 1.  
Go through all the questions with the participant, explicitly mentioning 
the actually chosen item in each question, e.g., if they have chosen the 
motorbike, refer specifically to it rather than the ‘item’ 
 
  Let the participant make his/her choice for each question.  
  Either after all choices have been made, or as they are making them, 
you should make sure that their choices are logically consistent, i.e. 
they have one of the following three patterns: 
•  Pattern 1: all ticks are on the right hand side (atrs), i.e., participant 
chooses cash in all questions 
•  Pattern 2: ticks have one “switchpoint”, i.e., they start on the left hand 
side with question 1 and continue till, for example, question 4. Then 
there is a switch to the right hand side at question 5 and all following 
ticks are on the right hand side. Such a pattern will be denoted by 
“sp4-5”. So, if the switch from the left column to the right column 
occurs between question 2 and 3, we call this  
“sp2-3”, etc. 
•  Pattern 3: all ticks are on the left hand side (atls), i.e., participant 
chooses item in all questions 
  If the ticks do not follow one of these patterns explain the inconsistency 
  to the participant and ask him/her to revise until the pattern is logically 
  consistent.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please 
tick the “r”-box – for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 1. 




  Now you have to provide the participant with the right instructions for 
decision sheet 2. There are different versions of instructions, i.e., one for 
each “switchpoint” from decision sheet 1. The acronyms will help you to 
find the right ones. Examples… 
•  If on sheet 1 they have ticked all of the cash amounts then for sheet 2 
they should be taken to the one labelled ‘atrs’ (i.e. ‘all ticks on the 
right hand side’) 
•  If on sheet 1 they have ticked all of their prize item (e.g. the 
motorbike, Rolex watch, cruise etc.) then for sheet 2 they should be 
taken to the one labelled ‘atls’ (i.e. ‘all ticks on the left hand side’) 
•  If the point at which they switch from the item to the cash amount or 
vice versa is after trade-off 3 for example, they should be taken to the 
sheet 2 labelled ‘sp3-4’ (switch point between q’s 3 and 4) 
•  …see below for examples… 
Sheet 1 
 




1)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £625 
2)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £875 
3)    □  My chosen item       OR        □  £1,125 
4)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £1,375 
5)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £1,625 
6)  …etc. 
If all ticks for each of the 11 options are in 
the left hand side boxes, then the buyers 








1)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £625 
2)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £875 
3)    □  My chosen item       OR        □  £1,125 
4)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £1,375 
5)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £1,625 








1)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £625 
2)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £875 
3)    □  My chosen item       OR        □  £1,125 
4)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £1,375 
5)    □  My chosen item       OR           □  £1,625 
6)  …etc. 
 
 
If all ticks for each of the 11 options 
are in the right hand side boxes, then 
the buyers should be asked sheet 2 
labelled atrs 
If the item is chosen for say the 
first 2 trade offs (i.e. on the left 
hand side), but they continue to 
tick all the cash amounts on the 
right hand side from then on, 
then the switch point is between 2 
and 3, so the buyer would be 




  After deriving the correct sheet 2 to take the buyer through read the 
instruction which matches their decision pattern from sheet 1 i.e. were 
they arts, atls, sp1-2, sp2-3 etc. (see next pages).  
Appendix 7 
atrs: (‘all ticks on the right hand side’) 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure.  
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £3,000.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £500 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £3,000 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in 
the box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 8 
Sp1-2 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £3,250.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £750 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £3,250 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 9 
Sp2-3 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £3,500.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £1,000 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £3,500 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 10 
Sp3-4 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £3,750.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £1,250 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £3,750 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 11 
Sp4-5 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £4,000.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £1,500 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £4,000 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 12 
Sp5-6 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £4,250.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £1,750 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £4,250 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 13 
Sp6-7 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £4,500.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £2,000 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £4,500 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 14 
Sp7-8 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £4,750.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £2,250 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £4,750 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 15 
Sp8-9 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £5,000.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £2,500 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £5,000 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 16 
Sp9-10 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £5,250.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £2,750 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £5,250 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
HAND SHEET 2 TO BUYER & READ OUT FOLLOWING TEXT TO THEM  
Appendix 17 
Sp10-11 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £5,500.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £3,000 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £5,500 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
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atls: (‘all ticks on the left-hand side’) 
  Ensure you have the correct decision sheet 2 for the buyer (i.e. the arts, atls, sp1-2 
etc. as derived from the sheet 1 answers) and make sure you encourage the subject to 
read the questions and smallprint carefully.  
 
 
Now you are facing a decision situation in which your chosen item does not figure. 
Your income depends on your throw of the die. If you roll a ‘6’ your income will be zero. 
Otherwise your income is £5,750.  
You can now buy an income protection policy. If you buy an income protection policy and 
you throw  
•  a ‘6’ the policy pays you £3,250 to compensate for the loss of income.  
•  any other number your income is £5,750 minus the insurance premium. 
In successive questions the premium is increased so you have to decide when it is 
sufficiently high that not taking insurance becomes the preferred option. 
We also provide the payout percentage for each policy. This is the percentage of the 
insurance company’s premium income that on average it pays out to policyholders to 
compensate for their losses.  
For example, a payout percentage of 15% means that for every pound of premium income, 
on average the insurance company pays out 15 pence to policy holders. 
I am required to tell you that in addition to my payment per interview I get a bonus 
depending on how much insurance I sell (i.e. the number of ticked insurance boxes I hand 
in). The salesperson who sells the most insurance will also get a prize. 
 
 
  You are allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words after you have red out the text, e.g., 
you might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not bought insurance 
and had thrown a ‘6’.  
  Subjects must fill out the sheet themselves 
  Whilst the buyer is filling out their sheet you are now only allowed to talk if the subject asks a 
question or makes inconsistent choices, e.g., switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please tick the “r”-box – 
for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 2. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the thrown number in the 
box at the bottom of the decision sheet.  
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SHEET 3: 
  Now you have to provide the participant with the right decision sheet 3. 
There are different versions of the decision sheet 3, i.e., one for each 
“switchpoint” from decision sheet 1. The acronyms will help you to find 
the right ones.  
 
 
The situation in the next set of questions is that you have taken out a loan to buy your 
selected item. You are expecting an income that is high enough to repay the loan with 
£2,500 left over. However, there is a chance that, due to bad luck, you will have no income 
at all and will be unable to repay the loan. The lender will then repossess the item. So you 
end up with no income and no item. To protect against repossessing the item, the lender 
offers you payment protection insurance. To enable you to pay the premium on the 
insurance, which is due immediately, the lender will increase the loan. In the event of 
losing your income, the insurance pays off the loan (including the extra repayment for the 
insurance premium), so at least you get to keep the item. 
 
After you have answered the questions on the next page about whether you would choose 
to buy insurance, you will throw a die to determine your income. Throwing a six represents 
bad luck i.e. your income is zero. Throwing any other number gives you the high income. 
So choosing insurance means you get to keep the item even if you throw a six but if you do 
not throw a six there is less money left over after you have repaid the larger loan. 
 
The next five questions ask if you want to buy insurance. Successive questions increase the 
insurance premium and hence the size of the loan repayment if you choose to insure, but 
that is all that differs between them. In each case we specify what you will end up with for 
each choice and how it depends on the number you throw. 
 
Again I am required to tell you that my compensation depends on how much insurance I 
sell.  




  You are now allowed to ‘advise’ the subject in your own words, e.g., you 
might tell the subject to consider how he/she would feel if he/she had not 
bought insurance and had thrown a ‘6’. 
  Make sure you encourage the subject to read the questions and smallprint 
carefully. Subjects must fill out this sheet themselves.  
  Whilst the buyer is filling their sheet out, you are now only allowed to 
talk if they ask a question or if they make inconsistent choices, e.g. they 
switch between insurance and no insurance twice.  
  If the subject requires prompting for decisions to be consistent please 
tick the “r”-box – for revised – at the bottom of decision sheet 3. 
  When all choices are made, ask the participant to throw the die. Enter the 




Now ask the participant to pick a number from the bag and note down 




Decision sheet for buyers 





Participant’s name:               
Participant’s number:              
 
Seller’s name:                  
Seller’s number:                 
 
Participant has chosen the following item: 
                     
 








1)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £625 
2)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £875 
3)    □  My chosen item       OR      □  £1,125 
4)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £1,375 
5)    □  My chosen item       OR          □  £1,625 
6)    □  My chosen item        OR          □  £1,875 
7)    □  My chosen item        OR         □  £2,125 
8)    □  My chosen item        OR         □  £2,375 
9)    □  My chosen item        OR       □  £2,625 
10)  □  My chosen item        OR        □  £2,875 







Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,000)  
  □  insurance at premium £111  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £500 and if you throw any other number you get £2,889) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,000)  
□  insurance at premium £143  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £500 and if you throw any other number you get £2,857) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,000)  
□  insurance at premium £200  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £500 and if you throw any other number you get £2,800) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,000)  
□  insurance at premium £250   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £500 and if you throw any other number you get £2,750) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,000)  
□  insurance at premium £333  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £500 and if you throw any other number you get £2,667) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,250)  
□  insurance at premium £167  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,083) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,250)  
□  insurance at premium £214  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,036) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,250)  
□  insurance at premium £300  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £750 and if you throw any other number you get £2,950) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,250)  
□  insurance at premium £375   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £750 and if you throw any other number you get £2,875) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,250)  
□  insurance at premium £500  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £750 and if you throw any other number you get £2,750) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,500)  
□  insurance at premium £222  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,278) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,500)  
□  insurance at premium £286  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,214) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,500)  
□  insurance at premium £400  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,100) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,500)  
□  insurance at premium £500   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,000) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,500)  
□  insurance at premium £667  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,000 and if you throw any other number you get £2,833) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,750)  
□  insurance at premium £278  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,472) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,750)  
□  insurance at premium £357  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,393) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,750)  
□  insurance at premium £500  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,250) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,750)  
□  insurance at premium £625   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,125) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £3,750)  
□  insurance at premium £833  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,250 and if you throw any other number you get £2,917) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,000)  
□  insurance at premium £333  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,667) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,000)  
□  insurance at premium £429  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,571) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,000)  
□  insurance at premium £600  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,400) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,000)  
□  insurance at premium £750   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,250) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,000)  
□  insurance at premium £1,000  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,000) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,250)  
□  insurance at premium £389  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,861) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,250)  
□  insurance at premium £500  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,750) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,250)  
□  insurance at premium £700  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,550) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,250)  
□  insurance at premium £875   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,375) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,250)  
□  insurance at premium £1,167  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £1,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,083) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,500)  
□  insurance at premium £444  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,000 and if you throw any other number you get £4,056) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,500)  
□  insurance at premium £571  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,929) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,500)  
□  insurance at premium £800  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,700) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,500)  
□  insurance at premium £1,000   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,500) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,500)  
□  insurance at premium £1,333  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,167) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,750)  
□  insurance at premium £500  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,250 and if you throw any other number you get £4,250) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,750)  
□  insurance at premium £643  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,250 and if you throw any other number you get £4,107) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,750)  
□  insurance at premium £900  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,850) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,750)  
□  insurance at premium £1,125   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,625) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £4,750)  
□  insurance at premium £1,500  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,250) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,000)  
□  insurance at premium £556  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,500 and if you throw any other number you get £4,444) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,000)  
□  insurance at premium £714  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,500 and if you throw any other number you get £4,286) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,000)  
□  insurance at premium £1,000  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,500 and if you throw any other number you get £4,000) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,000)  
□  insurance at premium £1,250   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,750) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,000)  
□  insurance at premium £1,667  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,500 and if you throw any other number you get £3,333) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,250)  
□  insurance at premium £611  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,750 and if you throw any other number you get £4,639) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,250)  
□  insurance at premium £786  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,750 and if you throw any other number you get £4,464) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,250)  
□  insurance at premium £1,100  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,750 and if you throw any other number you get £4,150) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,250)  
□  insurance at premium £1,375   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,875) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,250)  
□  insurance at premium £1,833  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £2,750 and if you throw any other number you get £3,417) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,500)  
□  insurance at premium £667  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,000 and if you throw any other number you get £4,833) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,500)  
□  insurance at premium £857  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,000 and if you throw any other number you get £4,643) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,500)  
□  insurance at premium £1,200  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,000 and if you throw any other number you get £4,300) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,500)  
□  insurance at premium £1,500   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,000 and if you throw any other number you get £4,000) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,500)  
□  insurance at premium £2,000  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,000 and if you throw any other number you get £3,500) 
 
Now throw the die.  






Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice. 
The payout percentage is the percentage of insurance company’s premium 
income that on average it pays out to compensate for policyholders’ losses. 
12)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,750)  
□  insurance at premium £722  (payout percentage 90%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,250 and if you throw any other number you get £5,028) 
13)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,750)  
□  insurance at premium £929  (payout percentage 70%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,250 and if you throw any other number you get £4,821) 
14)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,750)  
□  insurance at premium £1,300  (payout percentage 50%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,250 and if you throw any other number you get £4,450) 
15)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,750)  
□  insurance at premium £1,625   (payout percentage 40%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,250 and if you throw any other number you get £4,125) 
16)  □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get £5,750)  
□  insurance at premium £2,167  (payout percentage 30%) 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get £3,250 and if you throw any other number you get £3,583) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £111 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,389 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
  □  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £143   
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,357 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
  □  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £200   
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,300 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
  □  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £250   
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,250 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
  □  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £333   
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,167 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £167 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,333 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £214 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,286 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £300 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,200 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £375 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,125 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,000 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £222 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,278 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £286 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,214 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £400 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,100 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,000 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £667 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,833 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £278 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,222 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £357 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,143 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,000 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £625 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,875 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £833 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,667 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £333 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,167 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £429 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,071 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £600 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,900 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £750 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,750 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,000 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,500 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £389 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,111 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,000 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £700 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,800 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £875 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,625 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,167 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,333 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £444 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,056 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £571 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,929 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £800 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,700 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,000 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,500 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,333 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,167 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £2,000 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £643 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,857 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £900 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,600 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,125 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,375 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,000 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £556 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,944 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £714 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,786 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,000 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,500 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,250 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,250 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,667 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £833 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £611 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,889 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £786 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,714 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,100 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,400 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,375 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,125 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,833 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £667 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £667 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,833 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £857 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,643 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,200 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,300 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,500 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,000 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £2,000 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £500 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Please tick ONE of the boxes for EACH question indicating your choice.  
 
17)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £722 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,778 left after repaying the loan) 
18)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £929 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,571 left after repaying the loan) 
19)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,300 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £1,200 left after repaying the loan) 
20)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £1,625 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £875 left after repaying the loan) 
21)   □  no insurance 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’ you get nothing and if you throw any other number you get your chosen item 
plus the £2,500 left after repaying the loan) 
□  insurance which increases the loan repayment by £2,167 
(i.e. if you throw a ‘6’, you get your chosen item but no money and if you throw any other number you 
get your chosen item plus the £333 left after repaying the loan) 
 
Now throw the die.  





Table C1 provides summary statistics on the general demographic, personality and lifestyle 
characteristics of the buyers. Table C2 shows some financial characteristics of buyers and 
Table C3 summarizes buyers’ views related to the experiment. Table C4 provides 
characteristics of sellers and Table C5 shows our questions on personality traits. 
 




number / average    standard deviation 
       
Gender       
    Male  103     
    Female  111     
       
Age  40.43    11.66 
       
Marital status       
    Single  54     
    Married  108     
    living as married  36     
    Divorced  15     
    Widowed  1     
       
Social class       
                                                 
1 O levels (later replaced by GCSE) are a national school examination taken at around 16 and A levels are taken 
at about 18. The definition of social class is below. 
social 
grade  social status  Occupation 
A  upper middle 
class  higher managerial, administrative or professional 
B  middle class  intermediate managerial, administrative or professional 
C1  lower middle 
class  supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, administrative or professional 
C2  skilled working 
class  skilled manual workers 
D  working class  semi and unskilled manual workers 
E 
those at lowest 
level of 
subsistence 
state pensioners or widows (no other earner), casual or lowest grade workers 
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    A  0     
    B  24     
    C1  87     
    C2  59     
    D  44     
    E  0     
       
Academic qualification       
    O level or equivalent  128     
    A levels  59     
    University degree  35     
    Post graduate degree  25     
           
Employment status       
    full time (>16 hrs)  150     
    part-time  48     
    self employed  5     
    Retired  8     
       
 
Table C2  Financial characteristics of buyers 
  number / average    standard deviation 
       
Financial sophistication       
    High  26     
    Middle  113     
    Low  75     
       
Income  20,325.52    14,369.09 
           
Wealth (93 observations)  114,435.50    83,365.95 
       
Mortgage holders  124     
       
Mortgage holders with MPI  61     
       
Loan holders (unsecured)  79     
       
Loan holders with payment protection  31     
       
Currently considering taking out a loan  214      
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Table C3  Views on the experiment stated by buyers 
  number / average    standard deviation 
       
Perceived pressure exerted by seller (0..10)  1.58    2.03 
       
Concern about repossession of object (0..10)  3.83    2.94 
       
Concern about losing income (1..10)  4.47    2.81 
       
Confidence in decision (1..10)  7.82    2.25 
       
Usefulness of knowing sellers commission (0..10)  5.24    3.74 
       
Usefulness of knowing payout percentage (0..10)  5.76    3.25 
       
 
 
Table C4  Characteristics of sellers 
  number / average    standard deviation 
       
Gender       
    Male  12     
    Female  13     
       
Age  36.68    11.95 
       
Social class       
    A  0     
    B  3     
    C1  22     
    C2  0     
    D  0     
    E  0     
Employment status       
    full time (>16 hrs)  20     
    part-time  4     
    self employed  1     
    Retired  0      
Appendix 50 
       
Financial sophistication       
    High  3     
    Middle  22     
    Low  0     
       
Fulfilled a sales role in the last 5 years  25     
       
 
Table C5  Questions on personality traits answered on a 6 item Likert scale 
“I see myself as someone who…” 
   
Q1  “… is reserved”  
Q2  “… is generally trusting”  
Q3  “… tends to be lazy” 
Q4  “… is relaxed, handles stress well” 
Q5  “… has few artistic interests”  
Q6  “ … is outgoing, sociable”  
Q7  “… tends to find fault with others”  
Q8  “… does a thorough job” 
Q9  “… gets nervous easily”  
Q10  “… has an active imagination”  
Q11 (10 point scale)                                                                                                                                “I have a tendency to worry” 
The questions on personality traits are taken from Rammstedt and John (2007). 
 
 